

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

13 November 1967

The Honorable Charles L. Schultze
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

Dear Charlie:

I am writing in response to that portion of your letter of 27 October 1967 which relates primarily to my responsibilities for the intelligence community as a whole as distinguished from the Central Intelligence Agency. I share your belief that we must continue to review allocations of resources to meet over-all national intelligence needs and I agree with the importance you attach to the role of the Target Oriented Display (TOD). I believe that as we develop and refine the TOD, areas deserving particular study and evaluation will become increasingly easy to identify.

The problem which you suggest of ascertaining the real needs of the Government for information and the precise purposes which information serves is important and also complex. The work of USIB committees such as the GMAIC study on needs for ABM associated data, to which you refer in your letter, has been designed to help us in this connection. [REDACTED] of NIPE has described our attack on the Ballistic Missile problem to Mr. Fischer. This study is another example of our efforts to clarify needs for information and also of an attempt to develop a model which, premised on agreed specific goals of intelligence activity in an important area, is designed to determine the "observables," observation or coverage of which will help us to achieve these goals and to evaluate the performance of the systems or activities best calculated to afford access to or coverage of these "observables." 25X1A9a

Currently, in consultation with appropriate elements of the community, we are in the process of improving, modifying, and validating the conceptual approach and the methodology for this model in the hope that they can be applied to decision issues for FY 1969 and FY 1970. We believe that the process of community validation is a necessary step in the development of utility assessment studies.

We also believe that a community-agreed conceptual approach and methodology are prerequisites to your proposed ABM study. I am referring your proposed terms of reference to the community as a first step in achieving this end.

At the same time, we must recognize that even a major effort is not likely to produce all of the results implied by your terms of reference in time to be useful during consideration of the FY 1969 budget. Recognizing the time urgency and the major fiscal implications of the ABM problem, we will attack this problem with high priority, keeping you or your designated representative informed of our progress. The focal point in my office will be the D/DCI/NIPE with [REDACTED] as project officer.

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Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms/

Richard Helms

ABM Study

Terms of Reference

The major objective of this study will be to analyze the time urgency of requirements for intelligence on Soviet ABM activities by identifying the cost to our own strategic programs of near term uncertainty about various aspects of Soviet ABM. In other words, the study will attempt to establish the usefulness of a particular kind of intelligence in terms of improving the ability of the user to make specific decisions now in prospect. At least four kinds of decisions will be considered:

1. Force planning - The development and procurement of U.S. strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces are affected both by what we know and don't know about Soviet ABM, and by what we believe we will or won't know at some point in the future.
2. Force operations - Different kinds of Soviet ABM will require different weapons targeting, penetration tactics, withholding doctrine, defensive commitments, and command and control functions.
3. Politics and diplomacy - Decision-making in this area both leads and lags military affairs and a political leader may need additional information or the same information with greater reliability.
4. Intelligence - The intelligence community has its own unique needs for information on Soviet ABM either as a corollary indicator of other current activities or as an investment for the future.

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Obviously then, the study must consider both the current and future time frames including estimate of when we might know certain things.

More specifically, the study should first establish the utility of information on different characteristics of Soviet ABM's. We need to know what information is vital and what information is almost irrelevant. These needs should be expressed by user, by time period, and by allowable uncertainty.

Next, the study should devise a model whereby ABM intelligence needs can be satisfied from observables, i.e., from raw data provided by current or potential intelligence collectors. This portion of the study should suggest redundancies and interactions between collectors, and the degree and type of processing and analysis that are needed for each collector.

Finally, the study should evaluate the performance, cost, and schedules for current and planned collection and processing in terms of (1) their ability to satisfy the more important ABM needs and (2) their relative ability to satisfy other intelligence needs related to specific decisions about strategic forces.

This study should include full-time participation by representatives of the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. These representatives should be authorized to task agencies within their department.

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